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Does medical insurance affect health care demand and in the end contribute to improvements in the 
health status? Evidence for China for the year 2004, by means of the China Health and Nutrition 
Survey (CHNS), shows that health insurance does not affect health care demand in a significant 
manner. Counterfactuals suggest that full insurance coverage of the Chinese population will not 
radically change the health care decisions and may even enlarge the perverse effects of today’s health 
care system: insured persons are more likely to fall back on self-care when they are injured or ill than 
on the care of a local clinic. This effect is particularly strong in urban areas. In case of a severe injury 
hospital consultation is preferred to local clinic or self-care by most people, but still a substantial 
percentage (20 percent) resorts to self-care or ignores the illness. The high level of out-of-pocket 
expenses paid by both insured and uninsured patients lies at the root of this problem. Insurance does 
not offer real protection against unpredictable high health care expenditures and can lead people into a 
position of long-term poverty or serious liquidity problems. 
 
 
* Comments by Frans Willekens are gratefully acknowledged.
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1. Introduction 
“China is beginning to discover that market forces alone cannot produce good health 
care.” The Economist, August 19, 2004 
 
The Chinese health insurance market is in a state of flux as Chinese government tries 
to repair the financial and cultural obstacles that may impede the poor in trying to get 
access to essential health care services. The need for reform is large as the majority of 
the Chinese households do not have health insurance making them extremely 
vulnerable in case illness strikes a household member. Recent nationwide health 
services surveys indicate that excessive costs were the prime reason for not seeking 
medical care for a substantial part of the population: 38 percent did not seek medical 
attention while sick, 70 percent refused hospitalization after doctor’s referral and 
among early hospital discharges against medical advice 67 percent was associated 
with non-affordability of hospital expenses (WHO, 2005). In 2002 64 percent of total 
health expenditures in China were financed out-of-pocket and as numerous surveys 
indicate differences across regions are large. In some rural areas out-of-pocket 
spending as a portion of total spending was as high as 90 percent of household 
income. Large medical bills can lead the accumulation of debts, the withdrawal of 
lifetime savings, the use of family resources or the decision to forego adequate 
treatment of illnesses or injuries. When medical bills becomes excessive a household 
is forced to live in poverty and in case out-of-pocket expenditures exceed a certain 
threshold poverty becomes a long-term affair with all the subsequent negative effects 
on labor supply, savings and health status. The latest figures suggest that out-of-
pocket health care expenditures absorb 4 percent of household consumption and 6 
percent of non-food consumption. These averages cover up huge differences: 5 to 20 
percent of the households incur catastrophic health care payments (as a percentage of 
non-food consumption), i.e. they are susceptible to living in long-term poverty (Van 
Doorslaer et al., 2005). The picture sketched of the Chinese health care system 
suggests that widespread health insurance coverage is a sine qua non for the Chinese 
health care system to function properly. However, the question remains whether 
‘being insured’ solves the access problems of Chinese health care. If the price of 
health care is excessive, health insurance will not solve the problems of access since 
the insurance premiums will rise to cover the expected health costs. The price of 
insurance will in turn prevent access to adequate health care or generate long-term 
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financial problems. Knowing how the actions of insured persons differ from those 
who are not insured is of some importance in understanding the problems faced by 
Chinese health policy makers. 
This paper tries to come to grips with the present state of health care insurance 
in China by focusing on the health care decisions made by Chinese adults (17 years 
and older) and the role played by commonly used insurance schemes and the level of 
out-of-pocket expenses made by patients. The present study is therefore primarily a 
view from the demand side. Needless to say, the inner workings of the supply side 
(insurance companies, health care providers) should be of equal importance but the 
Chinese case is so complex and the diversity of experiences across this vast country 
so wide ranging that almost every study offers a partial view. A piecemeal 
examination seems to be the only feasible route for outside observers. The research 
findings suggest that full insurance coverage of the Chinese population will not 
radically change the health care decisions and may even enlarge the perverse effects 
of today’s health care system. Insured persons are more likely to fall back on self care 
when they are injured or ill than on the care of a local clinic. Consultation of doctors 
at hospitals is preferred to self-care, especially in case the illness turns out to be 
severe. Apparently in urban regions people do not trust the doctors at local health 
clinics, because most would prefer to go directly to a hospital. 
The first question that will be examined is the matter of insurance coverage: 
who is insured? Subsequently, what are the consequences of being insured, or more 
specifically how does an insured state affect health care decisions which ultimately 
impinge on the health status of adults? This question will be answered by first 
examining how it affects health decisions in preventive (general and prenatal care) 
and curative health care consumption and subsequently how these decisions affect the 
self-reported health status. To examine the current state of health care in China the 
China Health and Nutrition Survey 2004 will be used, a well established database that 
has proven its worth in tracking the health and nutritional status of Chinese in nine 
provinces that differ by economic and social development. 
 
2. Demand for Health Care and Insurance 
The demand for health insurance stems from the unpredictability of health care 
spending. Health risks have always been present, and for a long time people have 
been carrying these risks themselves out of their own pockets. Life insurance or 
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funeral insurance were well developed financial instruments by the end of the 19th 
century in the western world, but health insurance played a minor role. Once effective 
health care became an expensive but also valued commodity, health insurance became 
a desired and inevitable service. The value of health insurance is to be traced to the 
unpredictability of medical spending which could have a deep and long-run impact on 
the welfare of individuals or households through the loss of income or the 
expenditures on medical care (Gertler and Gruber, 2002). If a risk-neutral consumer 
faces no saving or borrowing constraints and medical spending in bad health states is 
affordable within the limits of lifetime income the need for health insurance is not a 
priori clear. Things change, of course, when people are risk averse, when liquidity 
constraints at every moment in time are binding, and when the lifetime income is not 
sufficient to pay the medical care bill. The natural solution for guarding against the 
risks of illness is to pool risks with others in the population. Under conditions of full 
information the fair insurance premium would be the average cost of care. The prime 
dilemma faced in practice by health care insurers is that they must face the tradeoff 
between the benefits from spreading risks against the increase of moral hazard. Once 
an insurer offers an insurance package that offers more protection against high 
medical spending during periods of illness it also induces people to make more use of 
health care as the price of health care is lowered. Moral hazard revolves around 
hidden action or an action with a hidden motivation and curtailing this is almost 
impossible as medical needs are not fully monitorable. Insurance companies solve the 
moral hazard problem by demanding some form of coinsurance. In other words, the 
insured are required to partially self-insure as they pay out of their own pockets for 
medical care received. Most insurance companies try to find a compromise between 
two extreme coinsurance solutions in which all risks are carried by the insured party 
and the other in which all risks are carried by the insurer, engendering greater moral 
hazard. With perfect knowledge an insurer could fully insure and thereby fully 
reimburse all spending on a specific treatment. However, in practice the severity of 
illness is not fully monitorable and thereby insurance leads to overconsumption of 
medical care when sick and in the end insured parties pay more for health insurance 
than is optimal (Cutler and Zeckhauser, 2000). 
 In this paper we will examine two types of health care consumption to see how 
insurance affects health care demand: preventive health care (in general and applied to 
prenatal health care) and curative health care. Preventive health care entails forward 
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looking decisions set in a lifetime framework. It varies from checking regularly for 
blood pressure, diabetes to taking medicine which prevents an event (like a stroke or a 
heart attack) occurring. Preventive action is akin to an investment in human capital 
and the level of time preference, initial health status and age all play a role in 
preventive health care demand (Kenkel, 2000).  
The consumption for curative health care differs from preventive health care 
as an event has actually taken place – an illness or an injury – and the decision at this 
junction in time is to seek advice about a cure or ignore the illness. Uncertainty and 
information are the keywords to understanding this element of health care demand. 
When struck by illness the patient has to diagnose whether or not the illness is serious 
enough to be treated by a medical professional. Each decision depends, of course, on 
the severity of the injury or illness and the risk one is willing to take that some injuries 
will heal by time or by self medication. The central issue in the present paper is, of 
course, whether health insurance and additional out-of-pocket health expenditures 
affect health care decisions and in turn the health status of people. 
The production of health may look simple in theory, in practice it is filled with 
a myriad of effects. Figure 1 presents the interrelationships that may exist between 
insurance, health care demand and health status. 
 
HERE FIGURE 1 
As noted by Levy and Meltzer (2001) “identifying the causal impact of health 
insurance on health is complicated by the fact that health insurance is not usually 
assigned randomly to individuals.” Both observed and unobserved characteristics of 
individuals affect every link of the chain of decisions or health states. The factors that 
affect health insurance status are also the same underlying factors which affect health 
investment, health status and the use of medical care. Furthermore, the theory of 
moral hazard predicts that health insurance has a negative effect on health behavior 
which prevents the appearance of a health risk. Therefore, a simple comparison of 
outcomes of insured versus uninsured may reflect either a causal effect of health 
insurance or simply differences between insured and uninsured individuals. This 
endogeneity problem makes it difficult to pinpoint causal influences in observational 
studies which according to Levy and Meltzer (2001) are “hopelessly confounded” by 
methodological problems of (1) identifying the direction of causation between health 
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insurance and health; and (2) controlling for unobserved factors that might 
simultaneously determine both health insurance and health status. Insurance coverage 
may be a function of health status, leading to endogeneity bias in estimates of effects 
of insurance on health and the use of medical care. The direction of the bias is not 
clear a priori as an anticipation of relatively high use of medical services might lead 
an individual to seek insurance, which yields an upward bias to the estimated effect of 
insurance on health care demand. The bias may also move in the opposite direction as 
insurers may be able to identify or screen people who will be intensive users and 
either decline to offer insurance or use price discrimination to separate the different 
risk groups. Levy and Meltzer suggest that the only true and informative test would be 
an experimental setting. Unfortunately such a setting is not within reach for most 
researchers and they have to correct for the problem of endogeneity in a more 
pragmatic fashion. In the current setting one can deal with the endogeneity problem 
by using an instrumental variables estimation (IV) strategy (cf. Hadley, 2003; Meer 
and Rosen, 2004).  
 
3. Data 
The analysis of the demand for health care and health insurance is based on the 2004 
wave of the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS). The CHNS is a collaborative 
effort involving the National Institute of Nutrition and Food Safety, the Chinese 
Center for Disease Control and Prevention, and the University of North Carolina at 
Chapel Hill. The 2004 survey covers nine provinces (see Figure 2) that vary 
substantially in geography, economic development, public resources, and health 
indicators. A multistage, random cluster process was used to draw the sample 
surveyed in each of the provinces (Liaoning, Heilongjiang, Jiangsu, Shandong, 
Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangxi, Guizhou). In 2004 the sample for each of the 
provinces is approximately 1,000 respondents, totalling 9,856 respondents for the year 
2004. Counties in the nine provinces were stratified by income (low, middle, and 
high) and a weighted sampling scheme was used to randomly select four counties in 
each province. The importance of taking account of regional differences is very 
important for the case of China. Studies by Ravallion and Chen (2006) and Zhang and 
Kanbur (2005) show how much progress China has made over the past decades but 
that economic and social inequalities have also substantially increased over the years. 
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HERE FIGURE 2 
 
The first round of the CHNS, including household, community, and health/family 
planning facility data, was collected in 1989. Five additional panels were collected in 
1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, and 2004.1 In the present study we will use just one year to 
gain an insight into Chinese health system and two sections from the CHNS, viz. the 
health services section and the individual adult survey section. To gain an insight in 
the Chinese demand for health insurance over time by means of the CHNS one can 
consult studies by Henderson et al. (1995), Akin et al. (2004) and Lindelow and 
Wagstaff (2005). The health services section contains detailed data on insurance 
coverage, medical providers, and health facilities that the household might use under 
selected circumstances. Questions about accessibility, and time and travel costs are 
asked at the household level. Information on illnesses and on all uses of the health 
system during the previous month is collected from all household members in the 
survey year.  
 
4. Insurance coverage 
Before examining the effect of health insurance on medical consumption we first 
explore the issue of health insurance demand, in other words: who is insured? To gain 
insight in the distribution of health insurance coverage we exploit the CHNS data for 
the year 2004. Similar exercises for early waves of the CHNS can be found in Akin et 
al. (2004). Of course, insurance contracts differ with respect to the level of out-of-
pocket expenditures and coverage of services insured, but at this stage we make no 
distinction with respect to those specifics. In examining who is insured we will use a 
number of explanatory variables, which are summarized in Table 1. An important 
variable which is not summarized in the table refers to the wealth class to which 
household members belong. A wealth variable is constructed by a linear index from 
asset ownership indicators2, using principal components analysis to derive weights as 
demonstrated by Filmer and Pritchett (2001). For the econometric analysis of wealth 
                                                          
1 For more information on the data and the set-up of the survey consult the CHNS website: 
www.cpc.unc.edu/china. 
2  The indicators used are binary variables indicating ownership of: radio/tape recorder, VCR, color 
television, washing machine, refrigerator, air conditioner, sewing machine, electric fan, computer, 
camera, microwave oven, electric rice cooker, pressure cooker, telephone, cell phone, VCD or DVD, 
bicycle, motorcycle, car, in-house tap water, safe water source, in-house flush toilet,  main cooking fuel 
biomass (wood/dung/coal), 
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effects a dummy variable is constructed which divides households into three classes: 
the poorest 40 percent of the population, the richest 20 percent and the middle wealth 
class (40 percent) is used as base category. 
 
HERE TABLE 1 
 
A number of observations can be made on the basis of this table. First of all, the low 
level of insurance coverage: 27 percent of the population is covered by some form of 
health care insurance. Another fact which reflects the Chinese economy is the 
relatively high level of people working in farming and residing in rural areas. The 
health status is relatively low if we compare this to earlier measured health 
evaluations (Lindelow and Wagstaff, 2005). In 1991 27 percent of the heads of 
households regarded their health as fair or poor, in 2001 this has increased to 37 
percent and in 2004 (see Table 1) this percentage has reached the level of 41 percent. 
At this point we are interested in who has health insurance and Table 2 gives 
some clues which factors are important in health insurance demand. 
 
HERE TABLE 2 
 
Insurance coverage is linked primarily to employment status. Employees of state 
enterprise or civil servants are generally known to have wide insurance coverage, 
whereas farmers or employees of small private firms have little or no coverage. 
Furthermore within the group of government employees education plays a significant 
role: a state employee with a university degree is 4.8 times more likely to have health 
insurance than a state employee with only a primary school education. It seems that 
wealth constraints are less important within the public sector than within the private 
sector: there are no significant differences between public sector employees of the 
three wealth classes. The role of education plays a far smaller role in the group of 
private sector workers: only among university trained workers can one detect a 
significant higher share of health insurance contracts. Among the group of private 
sector workers it is especially the farmers and people working in low-skilled services 
who are by and large uninsured. Another noteworthy element to be highlighted is the 
fact that there may be some form of positive self-selection in the demand for health 
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insurance. Those who are in favor of healthier lifestyles are also the ones who are 
more likely to have health insurance. 
Last but not least, the regional diversity of health insurance coverage is large. 
The chance of being insured of those living in rural areas is 65 percent smaller than 
those living in urban areas. Furthermore, the higher level of insurance coverage in a 
province like Jiangsu, and to a lesser extent in Shandong and Hunan, show that the 
regional diversity is a factor to be taken account with in sketching a picture of the 
Chinese health care sector. Jiangsu deserves some special mention as this is a 
province that has implemented a health insurance reform in 1997 which seems to have 
proven quite effective in controlling hospital charges and expenditures (Meng et al., 
2004). However, as shown by Akin et al. (2004) the province of Jiangsu has always 
been an outlier in terms of insurance coverage: in 1989 the insurance rate was 49 
percent, after which it showed some fluctuations but throughout that time Jiangsu has 
remained outstanding and again in 1997 the insurance coverage was 49 percent. Poor 
provinces like Guizhou, Guangxi and Hunan have always lagged behind in insurance 
coverage and still do. It remains an open question whether people residing in this 
province behave differently in matters of health care demand. In the remainder of the 
paper we will shed light on this issue. 
 
5. Does insurance coverage affect health care demand? 
In principle we would expect the presence of insurance coverage to affect medical 
consumption because insurance lowers the price of health care. The null hypothesis of 
testing the effect of insurance can therefore be formalized as follows: insured persons 
use more medical care than uninsured persons. In testing this hypothesis we make use 
of two types of medical consumption: preventive health care (section 5.1) and curative 
health care (section 5.2). The reason for making this distinction is to be traced to the 
fact that both services may differ in terms of characteristics valued by people. An 
illness or an injury represents a health shock which calls for immediate action. 
Preventive health care is quite different as there is no immediate shock which needs to 
be dealt with. The demand for preventive health care is a forward looking decision 
which may also be affected by the current health status (as approximated by the Body 
Mass Index) and health attitude. 
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5.1 Preventive health care 
To examine this type of health care demand we will focus on two types: general 
preventive health care and prenatal health care. 
 
General preventive health care 
The results are presented in Table 3 for two different models. The first (column 1) 
assumes that insurance is an exogenous variable and hence the conventional probit 
analysis of the choice of preventive health care consumption will suffice. However, 
Gruber (2000) and Meer and Rosen (1998) argue that in cases of insurance one should 
treat the status of being insured as an endogenous variable. Treating it as an 
exogenous variable would seriously underestimate the true effect of insurance 
coverage on health care demand.  Column (2) presents the marginal effects derived 
from instrumental variables (IV) probit estimation. 
 
HERE TABLE 3 
 
Two conclusions can be derived from Table 3. First of all, the estimation results do 
not lend support to the presence of large moral hazard effects in health insurance. In 
case insurance is considered an exogenous variable (column 1) it appears that the 
probability of making use of preventive health care services by insured persons is 3 
per cent higher than of uninsured persons. Re-estimating this model by means of IV 
probit estimation increases this marginal effect to 4 per cent but it turns out to be 
statistically insignificant and a small percentage compared to the induced insurance 
effects found by Meer and Rosen (1998). Furthermore, the other variables also show 
small effects for both models in the range of marginal effects of 1 to 3 percent. 
The second conclusion is that the endogenous model is not an appropriate 
approximation of the Chinese preventive health care market. In other words, being 
insured is too a large extent an exogenous event. Of course, this should not surprise us 
too much as the health insurance status is closely linked to employment status. The 
insurance status is instrumented in column (2) on the level of education of the 
respondent and the (Wald) exogeneity tests show that there is not sufficient 
information in the sample to reject the null hypothesis that there is no endogeneity. Of 
course, much depends on the suitability of the instrument(s) chosen. We experimented 
with alternative instruments but these did not overturn the conclusion that the 
 10
endogeneity of insurance status is not a problem and the regular probit estimates are 
sufficient to distill a picture of preventive health care demand. 
 
Prenatal health care demand 
The previous (survey) question referred to preventive health care in general, which 
covered services like a general physical examination, a blood pressure screening or a 
prenatal or postnatal examination. It would be of interest to see whether previous 
conclusion is robust when we focus on a specified preventive health care service. To 
attain this goal we have focused on prenatal care which is approximated by two 
specific questions (which apply only to women): (1) on the use of prenatal care during 
the most recent pregnancy; and (2) the number of prenatal examinations during this 
pregnancy. The estimation results (see Table 4) give rise to mixed conclusions. First 
of all, the effect of being insured on the probability of using prenatal care is certainly 
larger: having insurance increases the probability of prenatal care use by 14 
percentage points. 
 
HERE TABLE 4 
 
The endogenous model produces an effect that is twice as large as the probit model 
(28 percentage points), but again the ordinary probit model would have sufficed as the 
exogeneity test do not suggest that IV probit estimation is not an appropriate model. 
This is also the case when one considers the number of prenatal examinations. The 
marginal effect based on ordinary least squares suggests that women with insurance 
are liable to make 1.4 more visits than uninsured women. The instrumental variables 
estimate of the insurance effect suggests that this difference is in the range of five 
more visits for insured persons. This is a considerable difference. However, statistical 
tests (see Hausman test) show that the evidence of endogeneity is very weak in this 
case. 
 An observation that needs to be mentioned is the result that wealth constraints 
are of no importance in prenatal health care, whereas such constraints clearly have an 
effect on general preventive health care services, albeit a small effect. These effects 
are to some extent expected as family planning ranks high on the list of policy 




5.2 Curative health care 
The consumption of the curative health care boils down to the choice of health care 
provider in case respondents become ill or injured. In the CHNS-survey respondents 
were asked to reveal their choice of health care provider in case they became ill or 
injured in the month preceding the interview. Persons can choose between four 
alternatives: (1) ignore the illness or injury; (2) self care; (3) consult a doctor at a local 
clinic or local health worker; (4) consult a doctor at a hospital.3 There are two ways of 
modeling this choice, each with different implicit assumptions. The options can be 
ordered by costs, thereby suggesting to use ordered probit or logit estimation. 
However, the options need not be superior to one another and therefore ordered probit 
estimation may not offer the best estimation technique. For instance, self care may be 
a better choice in case people trust their own judgement more than that of a local 
health worker or doctor. And visiting a local clinic in case of the flu may offer quicker 
service than visiting a hospital with a few hours drive. The alternative modeling 
option is to frame the choice between the four health care options as being 
independent, and this is formalized in the multinomial logit model (see Verbeek, 
2004). The implicit assumption is that each individual chooses the option which 
generates the highest level of utility. The error terms tied to specific options must by 
independent, in other words, conditional upon observed characteristics the utility 
levels of any two alternatives are independent. If two or more options are very similar 
the multinomial logit model is not well suited to shedding light on the actual choice 
process. Estimated coefficients should not change very much for any subset of 
alternatives, as formalized in the Hausman and McFadden (1984) test for the so-called 
independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). A priori, we assume that the IIA applies 
and health care choices can be modeled according to the properties of a multinomial 
logit model. The base category against which the choices are evaluated is the option to 
ignore the illness or injury and in Table 5 the estimation results are presented of a 
simple model in which the demand for a particular health providers depends on a set 
of demographic variables (sex, marital status, age), regional variables and variables 
                                                          
3 In the CHNS questionnaire the options may seem clear but a substantial number of persons who 
claimed to choose for self care (eventually) went to see a doctor at a clinic or hospital, so for the 
present study we have used their eventual choices of health care provider. 
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describing the health background of the respondent.4 Note that the demand for health 
care in Table 5 applies to a special subset of the total sample because it refers only to 
those who have had an illness or injury in the past month.  
 
HERE TABLE 5 
 
The variable which is of central interest is the presence of health care insurance and at 
this point the perverse effects of health insurance become clear in the China of today. 
In the face of an illness insured persons are more likely than uninsured persons to 
consult a doctor at a hospital rather than ignoring the illness. To get a better grip on 
the quantitative impact of insurance coverage Table 6 presents the predicted 
probabilities of how Chinese would choose in case they are struck by an illness under 
three scenarios: scenario one represents the status quo of 2004, the second scenario is 
a counterfactual in which it is assumed that everyone has health insurance, and the 
third scenario shows the additional effects (on top of the mandatory insurance 
scenario) of equal access of all wealth classes. Naturally, the simulation results of 
Table 6 reveal the same pattern that one can derive from Table 5, but the predicted 
probabilities give a better view of how a representative person reacts and chooses 
among the four health care actions. To make the comparison more transparent we 
have disaggregated the choices by the severity of the illness. One can imagine that for 
illnesses that do not appear severe or life-threatening people will deliberate over 
ignoring the illness, taking care of it themselves or consulting a clinic, but certainly 
not consult a doctor at a hospital. In case the illness becomes more serious, the 
prominent options will be self-care and consulting a clinic. And for severe illnesses 
the logical choice would be to consult doctors at either clinics or hospitals. In that 
respect the calculations in Table 6 are revealing in that they suggest that hospitals are 
overused for illnesses or injuries that could have been dealt with at a lower level in the 
hierarchy of the health system and hospitals are underused for serious injuries. Of 
course this conclusion is also reflected in the other choices, where neglect or self-care 
rank high where the consultation of an expert would have been a wise step. The fact 
under present conditions that 17 percent of the severely ill or injured persons decide to 
                                                          
4 The possibility that IIA applies was tested by running a Hausman test.  The independence of 
irrelevant alternatives applies and this corroborated the assumption that the multinomial logit model is 
an appropriate model for the question at hand. 
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resort to self care and 3 percent tends to ignore the disease can be a devastative 
element in case a country is struck by highly communicable diseases like SARS or 
HIV/AIDS. 
 
HERE TABLE 6 
 
The counterfactual of mandatory insurance for the entire Chinese population suggests 
that the effects of this exercise are extremely small. The biggest increases are to be 
noted with respect to hospital use, especially for severe illnesses, and self care in case 
of illnesses of lesser importance. Apparently being uninsured is not the root cause of 
the Chinese health care system. The variable ‘wealth class’ in Table 3 offers a better 
clue what might be a major reason: the high price of health care. The steep increase in 
health care costs has made curative health care a good that is beyond the financial 
means of the poorest citizens. The likelihood that poorest citizens use self care and 
hospital care is 50 percent and 44 percent, respectively of what the middle wealth 
class uses. Neglecting illnesses or injuries is thereby significantly higher among the 
poor vis-à-vis the rest of society. The fact that the poor do not differ with respect to 
clinic use compared to the middle or top wealth classes suggests that the quality of 
health care at clinics is questionable, a fact which seems to be in line with the findings 
of Meng et al. (2000). This impression is reinforced by the fact that people with a 
healthy lifestyle are indifferent between visiting a clinic or ignoring the illness, and 
they are firmly set on resorting to self-care or a doctor at a hospital. Especially people 
residing in urban areas are apparently more accustomed to using self-care. People in 
rural areas are far more set on visiting a clinic and self-care is far lower, although the 
effects of mandatory insurance and equal access generate the largest effects in rural 
areas (see Table 6), where people switch more to self care and hospital care and they 
will decrease their use of local clinics. 
 
5.3 A reality check on the results 
The previous results are to some extent puzzling as they suggest that health insurance 
yields counterintuitive or even perverse effects: in case of an illness or an injury 
people with insurance and a positive health style would rather turn to self-care than to 
consulting a doctor at a clinic. For most Chinese the (local) clinic is the first place to 
visit in case of illness (see Liu, 2004a, 2004b) and foregoing medical advice does not 
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seem rational when you have health insurance, unless of course, the insurance 
contract covers very little and most the expenses have to be financed out-of-pocket. 
The estimated health care demand effects of insurance are also not in line with 
expectations. The endogeneity of health care demand - which seems widespread in, 
e.g., the US health care system - is virtually absent in the Chinese case and insurance 
effects are small or negligible. Of course, absence of a strong health insurance effect 
could mean two things: either human nature of Chinese citizens is ridded of moral 
hazard, or health care is so expensive that being insured may perhaps soften the blow 
of high medical bills but one can still run into a situation of liquidity problems or 
long-term poverty. Although there is no direct evidence on the first argument it would 
seem that Chinese are just as liable as US or European citizens to fall prone to hidden 
actions that lead to extra health care consumption. The first argument therefore does 
not seem a plausible factor in explaining the weak insurance effect. The expensive 
health care argument, however, does have a ring of truth. Reports of a faltering 
Chinese health care system are ample (cf. WHO, 2005, Meng et al., 2000, Liu et al, 
2000) and to stay close to the year of observation the following anecdote illustrates 
what may lie at the heart of the problem. China’s health care system made the 
headlines in an incident that came to light in April 2004. The incident revolved around 
a baby Rongrong, who was seriously malnourished by substandard milk powder and 
who was misdiagnosed by the village clinic and a rural hospital, even though they 
charged the father of the baby the equivalent of two and a half months salary. Only at 
a city hospital the correct diagnose was made but by then the baby was in a critical 
condition. After seven days and another three months salary-worth of hospital bills the 
baby was dead (The Economist, August 19, 2004). 
The Rongrong case comprises all of the drama of China’s health care crisis. 
Rural people often have to make do with local clinics or rural hospitals, which are not 
endowed with the most talented or qualified doctors or with sufficient means to 
provide services at a satisfactory level. Meng et al. (2000) show for clinics situated in 
rural villages that the quality of services was poor and that a large proportion of 
patient expenditure was due to over-treatment and, last but not least, quality 
differences between privately and publicly owned clinics are virtually absent. As one 
can deduce from Table 3 visiting a clinic is a more likely choice among people living 
in rural areas and resorting to self-care is a less likely choice. The largest rural-urban 
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differences in health care choices are with respect to use of clinics and self-care, as 
Table 4 demonstrates.  
The story of the perverse effects of health insurance does not seem to be 
related to health insurance as such but more generally to the (high) price and (low) 
quality of Chinese health care. The element of quality is known to play a significant 
role in health care consumption, especially with respect to aspects of family planning. 
The one-child policy in urban China makes couples place a higher priority on quality 
and not so much cost. A report (cited in Meng et al., 2004) notes that in wealthy areas 
child birth has increased at tertiary hospitals, thereby bypassing township or county 
hospitals. 
To see what the costs of health care are Table 7 reports the out-of-pocket 
expenditure incurred by the respondents underlying the results of Table 3. The 
concept of out-of-pocket is here defined as all net payments made by individuals for 
medical services. For those who have not insurance the concept is clear: all medical 
expenses are paid by the individual. In case of an insured person, the out-of-pocket 
expenses are 292 yuan, which constitutes 2 percent of annual personal income of the 
respondents concerned. Things are quite different when people consult and get treated 
at a hospital or a clinic. The percentage health expenditures which people paid for the 
full 100 percent out of their own pockets varies between 50 and 80 percent and 
according to definitions of financially catastrophic out-of-pocket spending – more 
than 10 percent of annual income - we can calculate that 10 percent of the respondents 
is in this danger zone and 50 percent of the respondents are running into short-term 
liquidity problems when ‘catastrophic’ is meant to mean that more than 10 percent of 
monthly income is spent on health care. This percentage is bound to be an 
underestimate because most health insurance contracts reimburse part of the costs and 
the out-of-pocket percentages in Table 7 refer only to expenditures which health 
insurance contracts exclude. Of course, these are self-reported figures but they accord 
well with the figures derived form National Health Accounts (cf. Van Doorslaer et al. 
2005). 
 
HERE TABLE 7 
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Estimating the effect of out-of-pocket expenditure on health care decisions is best 
done by focusing on a particular treatment.5 The categories of illnesses surveyed in 
the CHNS are generally too broad to be of use in testing this effect rigorously and 
where categories might offer some ground for testing the number of observations per 
category are too small. Nevertheless estimations which take account of interaction 
effects between insurance coverage and wealth class6 seem to suggest that the 
question of affordability is of crucial importance: it are primarily the poorest people 
who react most strongly to being insured.7 
The most troubling aspect of the Chinese health care system may well be the 
under-provision of socially desirable services and the over-provision of unnecessary 
services generating a low quality health care system (Liu and Mills, 2002) which sets 
in motion a pattern of health care decisions which increase the costs of health care 
even further. The fact that mandatory insurance decreases use of clinics and increases 
the use of hospitals is a suboptimal shift when care is offered at a lower price at a 
clinic than a hospital. To see how prices of health care treatment differ by health care 
provider we have run a regression explaining the treatment costs for a cold or the flu 
(see Table A1) and it appears that seeking advice at hospitals is significantly more 
expensive than a (village) clinic, in the range of 26 to 46 yuan extra. If people do not 
trust the expert advice of clinics for whatever reason and move to hospitals the 
Chinese health care system is burdened by inefficient health care behavior. 
With such high medical bills it is of some interest to whether the health care 
insurance premiums are equally high. If insurance does not help in preventing 
liquidity problems and long-term poverty it is quite understandable why 75 percent of 
the respondents are not covered by health insurance. The institutional setting of health 
care insurance has changed quite dramatically over the years and tracking this 
                                                          
5 The results of Table 3 have been re-estimated by replacing the insurance variable by level of 
coinsurance for outpatient hospital care (estimation results are available on request). The general 
insight from this test is that the level of coinsurance does not affect health decisions in a discernable 
manner. Insured persons whose hospital bills are completely covered do not differ in a significant 
manner from those who have to pay a large share of the bill or who don’t know the coinsurance rate of 
their contract. The latter group can be quite large as 20-30 percent of the insured apparently do not 
know which part of their hospital expenses they had to pay out of their own pocket. This 
counterintuitive result can in part perhaps be explained by the fact that respondents are asked ex post 
about their decisions and it could very well indicate that decisions are made without full knowledge of 
contractual coinsurance rates. After the fact (injury, illness) some remember the share they had to pay 
and others do not. In short, the experiment cannot offer a clear testing ground and would have to be 
complemented with an ex ante question to see how out-of-pocket payments affect health care decisions. 
6 Estimation results are available on request. 
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consistently over time with CHNS data will prove to be difficult. In Table 8 the most 
prominent insurance contract types are shown. In the past the government insurance 
(GLS) and labor insurance (LIS) were the two most dominant insurance forms for 
urban areas. The cooperative medical insurance played a large role in rural areas and 
still does but it has undergone significant change (WHO, 2005). The New Rural 
Cooperative Medical Scheme (RCMS) was the result of a reform initiated by the 
Chinese Communist Party Central Committee (CCPCC) and the State Council in 
2002. The scheme is not expected to have a major impact on health decisions of the 
poor, since its scope is limited to catastrophic illnesses and it excludes basic health 
services. The insurance contract stipulates full up-front payment of medical bills and 
reimbursement rates are in the range of 20-30 percent of medical bills. 
Today insurance types such as GLS and LIS do not have the same dominant 
position as they used to have a few years ago, since government employees have 
predominantly free medical service and unified planning service contracts. 
Commercial insurance is a novel type of contract but judging from Table 7 its market 
share is still small; a fact which seems to be inspired by the high commercial 
insurance premium. Other types are also used by state employees, save the 
cooperative insurance which is almost exclusively used by agricultural workers and 
farmers. Across the various regions there are no big differences in annual insurance 
premiums. There are, however, substantial differences across age groups, with old 
aged people paying considerably less than the young.8 
 
HERE TABLE 8 
 
To test for robustness of conclusions of Table 3 the results are re-estimated but this 
time replacing the insurance state by the type of insurance contract (see Table A3 in 
the appendix). The results point in the direction that only those insured persons with 
free medical service are the ones who make more use of hospital care than other 
insured persons. It should not raise surprise that the persons with a cooperative 
                                                                                                                                                                      
7 In the sample only 11 percent of the poor have a health insurance contract, which in most cases boils 
down to the cooperative health insurance, as most of the poor - 85 percent - reside in rural areas. 
8  See for details the appendix to this paper: Table A2. 
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insurance contract use clinics slightly more often than persons with other insurance 
contract types as the cooperative insurance mainly covers the rural areas.9 
 
6. Do health decisions affect the health of people? 
A final exercise in evaluating the state of Chinese health care system is limited to 
examining how health care decisions affect the self-reported health status. Most of the 
attention in the economics literature seems to go exclusively to the issue of poverty 
induced by soaring out-of-pocket expenditures (cf. Lindelow and Wagstaff, 2005). 
However, what interests us at this point is the question whether the health status of 
people is adversely affected by incentive structures of the Chinese health care system. 
The health status of the Chinese has decreased substantially over the past fifteen years 
and examining this decline longitudinally is unfortunately impossible as attrition the 
health care section of the CHNS has become too large to perform a meaningful 
analysis if one wants to cover the current situation in China. At this point the focus of 
attention is therefore on the present state of the Chinese health care system. The 
question which was put to the respondents was: “How would you describe your health 
compared to that of other people of your age?” with four possible evaluation states 
(i.e. poor, fair, good and excellent). As the question is stated, age should not matter 
that much in the evaluation, unless of course, evaluations become more skewed when 
people age or if people neglect the proviso and simply evaluate their health in 
comparison with earlier ages. Table 9 presents the ordered probit estimation of the 
health status, the second column presents the estimated coefficients and the 
subsequent columns present the marginal effects derived from the estimated 
parameters and evaluated at means of the explanatory variables. 
 
HERE TABLE 9 
 
The biggest factors influencing the self-reported health status of Chinese are: having a 
history of apoplexy (a stroke) and a severe illness in the past month. For instance, 
someone with an apoplexy history will increase the probability that this person will 
rate himself or herself as being in poor health with 35 percent, compared to someone 
with no history of the listed diseases. Of lesser importance are age, having a history of 
                                                          
9 The ascribed effect is however not significantly different from 1 if one invokes very strict levels of 
statistical significance, thereby making the effect not very robust. 
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diabetes and the occurrence of an illness that is somewhat severe. The probability that 
someone who has experienced an illness of moderate severity will rate his or her 
health as poor will increase by 12 percent, compared to the situation where this illness 
did not occur. If the illness turned out to be severe the corresponding marginal effect 
would have been 27 percent. 
 Of course, the effects that are of central interest refer to health decisions taken 
and use of the Chinese health care system. The use of preventive health care and 
adhering to a health lifestyle are decisions can both be interpreted as investments in 
health capital. According the two top rows of Table 9 these investments certainly have 
an effect, but as one would expect, these effects are small. An effect that raises some 
surprise is the fact that the action taken in case of a health care shock is negative or 
absent, whereas one would expect that consultation of an expert or self-care would 
always be superior to ignoring the illness or injury, certainly when an injury becomes 
a severe one. However, self-care or treatment at a clinic offer no compensating effect 
compared to the option of ignorance. And consultation and care received at a hospital 
yields the counterintuitive or perverse result that such a visit increases (decreases) the 
probability of being in poor (good) health. The effect is small, but nonetheless it 
remains a puzzle why expert care worsens health status. Closer inspection of this 
negative effect of hospital care on health status shows that it is absent for rural areas 
and present in full force in urban areas. What drives this result remains a puzzle if one 
uses the survey as the only source of information. But with market oriented finance 
reforms Chinese hospitals, especially state-owned hospitals, had to drastically cut 
back on the level of care. Health care facilities had to rely on their own revenues to 
cover 70 percent of their costs by the mid 1990s.  In 2003 state subsidies fell even 
further and covered only 10 percent of total costs of state-owned hospitals (Liu and 
Mills, 2002; WHO, 2005). Reactions from the supply side to these finance reforms 
were under-provision of cheaper public health services, concentration on wealthy 
patients (Liu and Xu, 1998) and concentration on curative services and medicines 
with high profit margins, services that are not necessarily the most appropriate (Liu et 
al., 2000). 
 
7. Conclusions and Discussion 
China has witnessed a tremendous change in its institutional structure of health care. 
From a centrally planned economy under Mao Zedong, it has moved starting to a 
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market based health care sector. The health care regime switch has not been without 
repercussions: the majority of Chinese are not insured, out-of-pocket health care 
spending makes health care unaffordable driving citizens into long-term poverty 
(Russell, 2004; Van Doorslaer et al., 2005), medical personnel in hospitals are 
working under perverse incentive structures thereby raising the price of health care 
and exacerbating the access problems of health care. This picture is in marked 
contrast with the era of Mao Zedong, when nine out of ten country people had access 
to subsidized health clinics run by the so-called ‘barefoot doctors’. As Diamond stated 
“economists from those countries [dropping central planning] embraced capitalism, or 
more specifically laissez-faire competition with an enthusiasm which exceeds that of 
western economists. Yet laissez faire capitalism has received little serious support in 
the West for a very long time.” (2002: 1233) The reason why it has received so little 
support can perhaps be found in lessons learned from the Chinese experience, which 
seems to make the case clear that the market for health care is fraught with all the 
imaginable textbook cases of market failure and government failure. Learning from 
these failures may be the way forward for Chinese policy makers. 
However, the attention for the Chinese case is not restricted to national 
interests but it touches clearly on international interests as communicable diseases - 
such as SARS and HIV/AIDS - can spread faster when the health care organization is 
in disarray and when the price of health care has become so high that people forgo 
specialized care and are tempted or forced to ignore serious illnesses or injuries. 
The present study has tried to sketch a picture of the current state of Chinese 
health care. A survey among (potential) users of health care can only scratch at the 
surface of the problems that the Chinese face, but nevertheless this side of the story 
generates enough worries. The fact that even insured people prefer self-care to 
(expert) care at a clinic or a hospital is a tell tale sign that something has gone wrong 
in designing the Chinese health care system and that simply making health insurance 
accessible or mandatory will not solve the problem. The real problems of the health 
care system are apparently the supply side and the demand side only reveals in an 
indirect manner that ‘something’ is wrong. The supply side is to some extent a black 
box but the reports on the soaring health care costs, counterproductive financial 
incentives at clinics and hospital, the use of ‘red packets’(bribes) in exchange for 
health care are all signs that jeopardize the health care system and with it the human 
capital of Chinese citizens. The ramifications of these problems may also affect other 
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initiatives of national and international concern. For instance, the International 
Conference of Population and Development of 1994 was focused on strengthening 
reproductive health care and making widespread access to such care possible. In 
China contraceptives are freely available as it fits in with the official ‘one child’ 
policy, but in a broader context the high insurance premiums and health care costs, the 
exclusion of prenatal care and delivery from insurance contracts, the deteriorating 
health status of Chinese are developments which are not conducive to attaining the 
goal of sound reproductive health care. And when one turns to the Millennium 
Development Goals of substantially reducing poverty by the year 2015, China’s 
health care system will only make things worse (Lindelow and Wagstaff, 2005). At 
the root of the problem of soaring health costs lies unsustainable fiscal 
decentralization, shifting the budget problems to local authorities who do not have the 
funds to maintain a sound health care system and inadequate governance of the supply 
side. The difficult task for the Chinese government is that a silver bullet solution does 
not exist. The problem is multifaceted and tackling problem with one solution – e.g. 
mandatory health insurance for all - will not suffice and may even may make matters 
worse in the short run for the demands on the hospital capacity. The same logic could 
apply to fighting HIV/AIDS. After ignoring the HIV/AIDS disease up and till the 
summer of 2002 the Chinese government is starting to recognize the seriousness of 
the problem and it designed a policy known as the ‘four frees and one care’ policy. 
Government has committed to (1) providing farmers and poor people free 
antiretroviral drugs, (2) free voluntary HIV testing and counseling, (3) free prevention 
of mother-to-child transmission, (4) free schooling for AIDS orphans and care for 
AIDS patients and their families (Thompson, 2005). Provinces and their counties are 
required to raise funds to support the implementation of these policies. Recently the 
government has doubled the budget (to more than 1.5 billion yuan) on prevention and 
control of HIV/AIDS in the years 2006-2007 (the Lancet, February, 2006). Again the 
government shifts the financial responsibility to lower levels of government thereby 
repeating history of health care in general. 
 
8. Appendix 
In this appendix three additional regressions are shown as background information for 
the reader. First of all, the diversity in treatment costs are explained per health care 
provider (Table A1). The analysis is based on household survey data of the CHNS. 
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Secondly, the diversity in insurance premiums are explained (Table A2) based on 
adult survey data of the CHNS. To check on the robustness of the conclusions reached 
in the paper on the basis of Table 3, health consumption decisions are rerun by using 
multinomial logit estimation to checking on the type of insurance contract (Table A3).  
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Description Mean 
Insurance state Percentage with medical insurance 26.7% 
Sex Percentage female 51.9% 
Educational level  What is the highest level of education you have attained?  
  Primary school   Graduated from primary school 27.3% 
  Lower middle school  Lower middle school degree 41.7% 
  Upper middle school  Upper middle school degree 14.5% 
  Technical degree  Technical or vocational degree 8.4% 
  University or higher  University/college degree or master’s degree or higher 8.1% 
Profession What is your primary occupation?  
   Senior professional  Doctor, professor, lawyer, architect, engineer 4.4% 
   Junior professional  Midwife, nurse, teacher, editor, photographer 3.8% 
   Administrator/manager  Working proprietor, government official, section chief, 
department director, administrative cadre, village leader 
4.9% 
   Office staff  Secretary, office helper 4.4% 
   Farmer  Farmer, fisherman, hunter 48.4% 
   Skilled worker  Foreman, group leader, craftsman 6.4% 
   Non-skilled worker  Ordinary laborer, logger 9.4% 
   Driver  Driver 3.0% 
   Service worker  Housekeeper, cook, waiter, doorkeeper, hairdresser, counter,  
salesperson, launderer, child care worker 
10.5% 
   Other  E.g. soldier, army or police officer, actor, musician. 4.8% 
Employment What type of work unit is this?  
  State  Government department, state service/institute or state owned 
enterprise 
19.0% 
  Small collective  Small collective enterprise (such as township-owned) 3.2% 
  Large collective  Large collective enterprise (such as owned by county, city, 
province) 
2.0% 
  Family farm  Family contract farming 46.1% 
  Individual enterprise  Private, individual enterprise 25.7% 
  Other organization types  4.0% 
History of: Has a doctor:  
  High blood pressure - ever told you that you suffer from high blood pressure? 8.9% 
  Diabetes - ever told you that you suffer from diabetes? 1.5% 
  Myocardial infarction - ever given you the diagnosis of myocardial infarction? 0.5% 
  Apoplexy - ever given you the diagnosis of apoplexy? 1.2% 
  Bone fracture Do you have a history of bone fracture? 4.7% 
Rural/urban site Urban = 0, rural  = 1 65.3% 
Severity of the illness  How severe was the illness or injury? (with reference to a 
sickness or injury incurred during the past 4 weeks) 
 
  Not severe   Not severe 39.6% 
  Somewhat severe   Somewhat severe 48.2% 
  Quite severe   Quite severe 12.2% 
Health action What did you do when you felt ill?  
   Ignore Did not pay any attention 12.7% 
   Self care Self care 31.2% 
   Doctor at clinic Saw local health worker or a doctor at clinic (village, private, 
work unit clinic, town family planning service) 
26.3% 
   Doctor at hospital Saw a doctor at a hospital (town, county or city hospital) 29.9% 
Child died Have you ever given birth to a child who was born alive but 
later died? No = 0, yes = 1 
3.4% 
Use of prenatal care Did you have prenatal care during this [the most recent, and in 
case pregnant not the present] pregnancy? No = 0, yes = 1 
78.3% 
Number of prenatal 
checkups 
How many prenatal examinations did you have altogether? 4.9 
Health preventive action 
past month 
During the past 4 weeks did you receive any preventive health 
service, such as health examination, eye examination, blood test, 
blood pressure screening, tumor screening? (no = 0, yes =1) 
3.5% 
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Weight Body Mass Index constructed on the basis of questions on 
weight and height (mean = 23.3, standard deviation = 4.4) 
 
 Underweight 7.0% 
 Normal 65.8% 
 Overweight 22.7% 
 Obese 4.5% 
Health status Right now, how would you describe your health compared to 
that of other people of your age? (1) poor , (2) fair, (3) good, (4) 
excellent 
 
 Poor 7.3% 
 Fair 33.3% 
 Good 45.4% 
 Excellent 14.0% 
Health lifestyle Scale based on two items: How important in your life is (1) 
being physically active; and (2) eating a healthy diet? With 
answers ranging from value 1 (not important at all) to value 5 
(the most important). [NB: calculated scale reliability is 0.81] 
3.11 




Table 2: Who has health insurance? Logit analysis of the probability of being 
insured (no insurance = base category)a 
 Being insured  (not = 0) 
 Total sample By employment sector: 
  Private sector Public sector 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Age group (17-35 = 0) Odds r. z-value Odds r. z-value Odds r. z-value 
  36-45 1.61** 3.46 1.47* 2.18 1.96** 3.09 
  46-64 1.73** 3.94 1.69** 2.98 1.73* 2.47 
  65+ 1.20 0.66 1.25 0.76 0.76 0.44 
Sex (male=0) 0.88 1.52 0.83 1.72 0.87 0.87 
Health lifestyle 1.30** 3.64 1.29** 2.88 1.39** 2.39 
Wealth (middle = 0)       
   Lowest 40% 0.75* 1.97 0.70* 2.14 1.00 0.00 
   Top 20% 1.38* 2.31 1.36 1.39 1.42 1.92 
Educational level (primary 
school = 0) 
      
  Lower middle school 1.01 0.06 0.97 0.20 1.53 1.05 
  Upper middle school 1.39 1.95 1.36 1.55 2.38* 2.03 
  Technical or vocational degree 1.92** 3.06 1.36 0.92 4.02** 3.15 
  University or higher 2.62** 4.10 2.32* 2.13 4.79** 3.45 
Profession (senior prof. = 0)       
   Junior professional 1.11 0.38 0.96 0.05 1.08 0.26 
   Administrator 0.58* 2.23 0.41 1.83 0.78 0.82 
   Office staff 1.02 0.07 0.83 0.33 1.16 0.51 
   Farmer 0.24** 4.06 0.22** 3.06 1.11 0.32 
   Skilled worker 1.34 1.13 1.27 0.52 0.99 0.03 
   Non-skilled worker 0.82 0.76 0.65 0.96 1.16 0.25 
   Driver 0.60 1.56 0.44 1.60 0.31** 2.69 
   Service worker 0.36** 3.82 0.33* 2.45 - - 
   Other 0.66 1.60 0.50 1.45 0.88 0.35 
Employer status (state = 0)       
  Small collective 0.37** 4.29 (= 0) - - - 
  Large collective 0.32** 3.90 0.99 0.04 - - 
  Family contract farming 0.40** 3.00 0.87 0.33 - - 
  Private, individual enterprise 0.14** 11.94 0.36** 3.40 - - 
  Other 0.32** 4.93 0.97 0.10 - - 
Province (Liaoning = 0)       
  Heilongjiang 1.87* 2.53 3.11** 3.08 1.19 0.59 
  Jiangsu 20.93** 14.36 26.63** 13.92 2.98** 2.82 
  Shandong 2.69** 4.57 3.62** 4.94 1.30 0.77 
  Henan 0.78 1.29 0.44* 2.41 1.22 0.59 
  Hubei 1.32 1.37 1.16 0.56 1.98 1.74 
  Hunan 2.74** 4.82 2.93** 4.02 2.60** 2.66 
  Guangxi 0.79 1.22 0.66 1.50 1.28 0.66 
  Guizhou 0.86 0.68 0.90 0.31 0.79 0.76 
Rural state (urban = 0) 0.73* 2.36 0.75 1.43 0.67* 2.24 
     
Pseudo R2 0.38 0.34 0.12 
N =  4,193 3,215 976 
(a) Hubert-White correction is used to account for heteroskedasticity in estimation. Statistical 




Table 3: Do insured people choose consume different amounts of preventive 
health care services? Estimated marginal effectsa 
 
 Use of preventive health care services 
 Probit-estimation IV probit-estimation 
 (1) (2) 
 Effect z-value Effect z-value 
Insurance (not insured = 0) 0.03** 4.65 0.04 1.53 
Age group (17-35 = 0)     
  36-45 -0.02** 3.78 -0.02** 3.79 
  46-64 -0.00 0.27 -0.00 0.37 
  65+ -0.00 0.95 -0.01 1.07 
Sex (male=0) 0.01** 2.61 0.01** 2.63 
Wealth (middle = 0)     
   Lowest 40% -0.01** 3.03 -0.01** 2.79 
   Top 20% 0.00 0.85 0.00 0.43 
Weight (normal = 0)     
  Underweight -0.00 0.56 0.00 0.52 
  Overweight 0.01 1.26 0.01 1.22 
  Obese -0.00 0.15 0.00 0.10 
Health attitude 0.00 1.45 0.00 1.26 
Province (Liaoning = 0)     
  Heilongjiang -0.01 1.00 -0.01 1.05 
  Jiangsu 0.01 0.64 0.00 0.21 
  Shandong 0.03** 2.88 0.03** 2.79 
  Henan -0.01 1.72 -0.01 1.59 
  Hubei 0.02 1.93 0.02 1.92 
  Hunan -0.00 0.72 -0.01 0.77 
  Guangxi -0.00 0.34 -0.00 0.23 
  Guizhou -0.02** 3.14 -0.02** 3.07 
Rural state -0.01** 3.51 -0.01** 3.22 
     
Ln σ - - -0.96** 110.22 
Atanh ρ - - -0.05 0.49 
Wald test of exogeneity (p-value) - 0.24 (0.626) 
Pseudo R2 0.10 - 
N =  6,527 6,527 
(a) The marginal effects represent the effect of a discrete change of a dummy variable from 0 to 1. 
Statistical significance at levels: * < 5%, ** < 1%. Method of estimation is instrumental variables 






Table 4: Do insured people choose consume different amounts of prenatal health 
care services? Estimated effectsa 
 
 Use of prenatal health care services 
 Use of prenatal care Number of check-ups 
 probit IV-probit OLS 2SLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Effect Effect Coef. Coef. 
Insurance (not insured = 0) 0.14** 0.28** 1.41* 5.25 
Age -0.01** -0.02** 0.01 -0.01 
Child died -0.27 -0.24 0.39 0.60 
Wealth (middle = 0)     
   Lowest 40% -0.09 -0.07 -0.61 -0.41 
   Top 20% 0.01 -0.00 0.85 0.50 
Weight (normal = 0)     
  Underweight 0.24* 0.21 0.96 1.23 
  Overweight 0.16** 0.17** 1.32 1.66 
  Obese 0.16** 0.16** 0.60 0.72 
Health attitude -0.05 -0.06 -0.17 -0.43 
Province (Liaoning = 0)     
  Heilongjiang 0.11 0.12 -2.56* -2.44 
  Jiangsu 0.11 0.02 -0.52 -1.96 
  Shandong 0.05 0.06 -1.81 -1.11 
  Henan 0.17** 0.19** -2.56* -2.21 
  Hubei 0.12* 0.15* -0.50 0.11 
  Hunan 0.06 0.01 -1.09 -1.87 
  Guangxi 0.21** 0.24** 0.27 1.03 
  Guizhou 0.14* 0.15** -1.50 -0.80 
Rural state (urban = 0) 0.02 0.03 -2.41** -2.24** 
Constant - - 9.32** 9.12** 
     
Ln σ - -1.11** - - 
Atanh ρ - -0.44 - - 
Wald test of exogeneity (p-value)  1.75 (0.186) - - 
Hausman test  χ2 (prob > χ2) - - - 2.46 (0.117) 
Pseudo R2 0.19 - 0.22b 0.08 b 
N  241 241 192 192 
 
(a ) The marginal effects represent the effect of a discrete change of a dummy variable from 0 to 1. 
Statistical significance at levels: * < 5%, ** < 1%. In case of instrumental variables estimation, the 
binary variable ‘insurance state’ is instrumented on the level of education. 




Table 5: Does insurance type matter in choosing health care providers compared 
to the option of ignoring the illness or injury (Relative risk ratios of multinomial 
logit estimation) a 
 
 Self care  Doctor at clinic Doctor at hospital 
 RRR z-value RRR z-value RRR z-value 
Insurance (not insured = 0) 1.38 1.61 1.09 0.40 1.50* 1.97 
Wealth (middle = 0)       
   Lowest 40% 0.50** 3.62 0.73 1.65 0.44** 4.19 
   Top 20% 1.27 1.04 0.71 1.34 1.30 1.11 
Age group (17-35 = 0)       
  36-45 0.61 1.65 0.51* 2.13 0.74 0.94 
  46-64 0.63 1.65 0.54* 2.11 0.77 0.88 
  65+ 0.66 141 0.63 1.50 1.13 0.39 
Sex (male=0) 0.89 0.76 1.02 0.12 0.94 0.39 
Marital status (never married = 0)       
  Married 2.20* 2.30 2.03* 2.04 1.74 1.56 
  Separated/widowed 1.94 1.60 1.98 1.65 1.42 0.83 
Health attitude 1.31* 2.17 1.13 0.93 1.41** 2.69 
Severity of the illness  
(not severe = 0) 
      
  Somewhat severe 1.25 1.39 1.49* 2.40 2.53** 5.51 
  Quite severe 2.44* 2.19 4.18** 3.59 15.42** 7.04 
Province (Liaoning = 0)       
  Heilongjiang 1.16 0.39 1.99 1.61 2.17 1.91 
  Jiangsu 0.38** 3.33 1.42 1.05 0.87 0.44 
  Shandong 0.38** 2.79 2.34* 2.42 1.60 1.38 
  Henan 0.33** 3.29 3.72** 4.04 1.77 1.77 
  Hubei 0.77 0.83 2.73** 2.90 1.67 1.50 
  Hunan 0.94 0.20 1.64 1.37 1.45 1.10 
  Guangxi 0.84 0.53 2.58** 2.74 2.03* 2.11 
  Guizhou 0.89 0.37 2.47** 2.65 1.30 0.77 
Rural state (urban = 0) 0.87 0.75 2.06** 3.85 1.62** 2.58 
       
Pseudo R2  0.09 
N 2,052 





Table 6: How economy-wide insurance affects health decisions – predicted probabilitiesa 
 
 Probability that health action will be taken: 
 Ignore Self care Clinic Hospital 
Severity of illness Percentages 
Not severe Rural Urban Total Rural Urban Total Rural Urban Total  Rural Urban Total 
   Status quo 16.2 15.1 15.7 29.0 49.2 38.0 35.7 16.5 27.1 19.0 19.2 19.2 
   + All insured 13.9 13.2 13.6 31.3 50.9 40.2 32.8 15.1 24.8 21.9 20.7 21.5 
   + Equal access 10.7 12.9 11.7 33.8 49.3 40.6 30.5 17.7 24.8 25.1 20.0 22.8 
   Total change -5.5 -2.2 -4.0 +4.8 +0.1 +2.6 -5.2 +1.2 -2.3 +6.1 +0.8 +3.6 
Somewhat severe             
   Status quo 10.5 10.6 10.5 23.8 40.1 30.8 34.2 17.3 26.9 31.5 31.9 31.7 
   + All insured 8.8 9.2 8.9 25.2 41.1 32.0 30.5 15.6 24.1 35.5 34.1 35.0 
   + Equal access 6.5 8.7 7.5 26.4 40.2 32.3 27.7 17.4 23.3 39.4 33.6 36.9 
   Total change -4.0 -1.9 -3.0 +2.6 +0.1 +1.5 -6.5 +0.1 -3.6 +7.9 +1.7 +5.2 
Quite severe             
   Status quo 3.5 3.3 3.4 13.4 21.8 17.1 29.6 16.5 23.9 53.4 58.3 55.6 
   + All insured 2.8 2.8 2.8 13.7 21.9 17.2 25.1 14.5 20.5 58.3 60.8 59.5 
   + Equal access 1.8 2.6 2.2 14.0 21.6 17.1 20.6 15.2 18.4 63.6 60.6 62.4 
    Total change -1.7 -0.7 -1.2 +0.6 -0.2 0.0 -9.0 -1.3 -5.5 +10.2 +2.3 +6.8 
 
(a) The scenarios ‘all insured’ and ‘equal access’ are constructed by respectively assuming that everyone is insured and that wealth class effects in making health 




Table 7: Out-of-pocket expenses (in yuan) in health care insurance contracts 
 Self care Clinic Hospital Preventive health 
care 
   Inpatienta Outpatient  
Average total cost 292.2 233.6 514.6 700.7 60.9 
% completely self  
paid expenses 
100 80.3 51.9 66.8 87.7 
OOPE as % of 
annual personal 
income 
1.7 6.3 0.4 
% who spends 
>10% of wage 
income (monthly) 
19.5 50.9 16.0 
> 10% of total 
annual income 
3.7 10.2 10.0 
(a) The cost per day hospitalized. For the sample examined the average total cost of the inpatient 
treatment was 7495.2 yuan. 




Table 8: Insurance contracts and some characteristics, 2004 
 





%  of insured who are: 
 
Prenatal care and delivery 
services: covered by 
insurance? 








6.8 903.4 38.2 32.4 70.7 20.7 
Free medical 
service 
28.3 215.6 37.1 86.5 45.5 23.6 
Worker’s 
compensation 
17.1 502.6 37.5 47.3 46.7 34.1 
Cooperative 
insurance 
27.9 56.2 81.4 1.9 73.1 23.5 
Unified Planning 
Service 
16.7 256.3 29.1 77.2 60.4 26.0 
Other 3.2 387.2 30.6 53.7 66.7 22.9 
Average  292.2 48.0 46.6 60.0 25.2 
 
Source: CHNS, wave 2004 
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Table 9: Explaining the relative health status (ordered probit analysis) and 
marginal effects of changes in explanatory variablesa 
 
 Self reported relative health status: 
 Poor Fair Good Excellent 
 
Ordered probit 
coefficients Marginal effects (dy/dx) 
Health investment      
Used preventive health care past   
month (no = 0) 
0.33** -0.07** -0.05* 0.09** 0.02** 
Health lifestyle 0.12** -0.03** -0.01** 0.03** 0.01** 
      
Health shock      
Severity of the illness (not severe = 0)      
  Somewhat severe -0.46** 0.12** 0.04** -0.13** -0.03** 
  Quite severe -0.84** 0.27** -0.05* -0.20** -0.03** 
Health care used in case of illness 
(ignore = 0) 
     
  Self care 0.15 -0.04 -0.01 0.05* 0.01 
  Clinic -0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 
  Hospital -0.21* 0.05* 0.01** -0.05* -0.01** 
      
Health capital      
Age group (17-35 = 0)      
  36-45 -0.25** 0.07** 0.01** -0.07** -0.01** 
  46-64 -0.48** 0.13** 0.03** -0.13** -0.03** 
  65+ -0.52** 0.14** 0.03* -0.14** -0.03** 
Sex (male=0) -0.19** 0.05** 0.01** -0.05** -0.01** 
Weight (normal = 0)      
  Underweight -0.26** 0.07* 0.01** -0.07** -0.01** 
  Overweight 0.11 -0.03 -0.01 0.03 0.01 
  Obese 0.11 -0.03 -0.01 0.03 0.01 
Presence of  disease history of:b 
(none = 0) 
     
  High blood pressure -0.16* 0.04* 0.01** -0.04* -0.01* 
  Diabetes -0.42** 0.13** -0.00 -0.11** -0.02** 
  Myocardial infarction -0.33 0.10 0.01 -0.09 -0.01 
  Apoplexy -1.00** 0.35** -0.11* -0.21** -0.02** 
  Bone fracture -0.19* 0.05* 0.01** -0.05* -0.01* 
      
Control variables      
Province (Liaoning = 0)      
  Heilongjiang -0.12 0.03 0.01** -0.03 -0.01 
  Jiangsu 0.25** -0.06** -0.03* 0.07** 0.02* 
  Shandong 0.08 -0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.01 
  Henan 0.10 -0.02 -0.01 0.03 0.01 
  Hubei 0.02 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 
  Hunan -0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
  Guangxi -0.21* 0.06 0.01 -0.06** -0.01** 
  Guizhou -0.19 0.05 0.01** -0.05* -0.01* 
Rural state (urban = 0) -0.14* 0.04** 0.01* -0.04** -0.01** 
      
Pseudo R2 0.09     
N = 1,960     
 
(a) Statistical significance at levels: * < 5%, ** < 1%For matters of convenience, cut-off points have 
been removed from the table. 
(b) The disease history is set at one year or longer, i.e. people have experienced designated problems 
for at least one year or longer. 
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Table A1: Understanding diversity in treatment costs per health providera 
 
 Explaining treatment costs 
 OLS-coefficient t-value 
Health care provider (village clinic = 0)   
  Private clinic 4.07 1.5 
  Work unit clinic 8.48 1.2 
  Other clinic 4.11 0.4 
  Town family planning service 13.22 0.5 
  Town hospital 5.10* 2.2 
  County maternal and child hospital 6.46 0.5 
  County hospital 25.80** 10.8 
  City maternal and child hospital 44.58** 3.1 
  City hospital 34.66** 12.8 
  Worker’s hospital 27.01** 5.6 
  Other hospital 38.20** 5.3 
  Drugstore -3.98 0.7 
  Other 14.02* 2.4 
Contract with village or work unit (no 
contract = 0) 
2.43 1.2 
Province (Liaoning = 0)   
  Heilongjiang -7.30* 2.2 
  Jiangsu 27.16** 9.0 
  Shandong -10.96** 3.4 
  Henan -11.13** 3.4 
  Hubei 4.02 1.3 
  Hunan -8.32* 2.5 
  Guangxi -26.35** 8.4 
  Guizhou -15.59** 4.9 
Rural state (urban = 0) -13.90** 6.9 
Constant 42.19** 9.2 
   
Adjusted R2 0.14 
N = 5,941 
 
(a)  The compare the price of a treatment across health care facilities we have used the money a person 





Table A2: …and of insurance premiumsa 
 
 Explaining health insurance premiums 
 OLS- coefficient t-value 
Insurance type (commercial insurance = 0)   
  Free medical service -606.2** 10.5 
  Worker’s compensation -349.6** 5.6 
  Cooperative insurance -795.7** 14.0 
  Unified Planning Service -587.5** 9.6 
  Other -528.6** 6.2 
Age group (17-35 = 0)   
  36-45 158.1** 3.9 
  46-64 31.5 0.9 
  65+ -184.6** 4.3 
Province (Liaoning = 0)   
  Heilongjiang -122.4* 2.1 
  Jiangsu 32.3 0.6 
  Shandong 79.3 1.3 
  Henan -48.3 0.6 
  Hubei -97.7 1.4 
  Hunan 7.5 0.1 
  Guangxi -14.6 0.2 
  Guizhou -147.5 1.9 
Rural state (urban = 0) -74.7* 2.3 
Constant 968.3** 12.0 
   
Adjusted R2 0.20 
N = 1,616 
 





















Table A3: Does insurance type matter in choosing health care providers? a 
 
 Self care  Doctor at clinic Doctor at hospital 
 RRR z-value RRR z-value RRR z-value 
Insurance type (no insurance = 0)       
  Commercial insurance 5.45 1.61 1.79 0.49 3.01 1.00 
  Free medical service 1.32 0.90 0.79 0.67 1.89* 2.03 
  Worker’s compensation 1.04 0.12 0.57 1.47 1.41 1.06 
  Cooperative insurance 1.16 0.43 1.83 1.85 1.58 1.37 
  Unified planning medical service 1.40 0.95 0.74 0.71 0.72 0.83 
Wealth (middle = 0)       
   Lowest 40% 0.51** 3.50 0.71 1.82 0.44** 4.26 
   Top 20% 1.25 0.94 0.80 0.82 1.29 1.01 
Age group (17-35 = 0)       
  36-45 0.59 1.74 0.50* 2.18 0.75 0.88 
  46-64 0.63 1.63 0.54* 2.10 0.80 0.75 
  65+ 0.66 1.41 0.67 1.30 1.16 0.46 
Sex (male=0) 0.88 0.77 0.97 0.16 0.94 0.37 
Marital status (never married = 0)       
  Married 2.26* 2.37 2.00* 1.99 1.71 1.49 
  Separated/widowed 2.00 1.67 1.96 1.62 1.41 0.80 
Health attitude 1.29* 2.07 1.16 1.14 1.42** 2.75 
Severity of the illness  
(not severe = 0) 
      
  Somewhat severe 1.25 1.37 1.51* 2.49 2.51** 5.43 
  Quite severe 2.41* 2.15 4.14** 3.56 15.83** 7.10 
Province (Liaoning = 0)       
  Heilongjiang 1.16 0.39 1.87 1.46 2.31* 2.07 
  Jiangsu 0.41** 2.87 1.19 0.50 0.87 0.41 
  Shandong 0.42** 2.52 1.97 1.91 1.60 1.37 
  Henan 0.29** 3.60 3.71** 4.03 1.88 1.94 
  Hubei 0.76 0.85 2.64** 2.78 1.85 1.79 
  Hunan 0.91 0.30 1.58 1.26 1.64 1.44 
  Guangxi 0.83 0.57 2.50** 2.65 2.10* 2.20 
  Guizhou 0.89 0.38 2.34** 2.49 1.35 0.87 
Rural state (urban = 0) 0.88 0.73 1.97** 3.58 1.59** 2.45 
       
Pseudo R2  0.10 
N 2,035 
 
(a) Significance levels denoted as * < 5%, ** < 1% 
